With negotiations over Iran’s illicit nuclear program having recently resumed, supporters of the seemingly never-ending negotiating process — one that has disproportionally favored Iranian interests — continue to spin the original interim agreement and its subsequent extensions (the Joint Plan of Action) as a success.
This false assertion rests on the propagation of several myths, notably that the JPA has frozen Iran’s nuclear program; the Iranian regime negotiating team represents a moderate faction distinct from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Supreme Leader and other regime hardliners; and U.S. pressure and negotiating leverage has remained constant throughout the process.
The primary underpinning myth is the notion that the JPA has frozen — even rolled back — Iran’s nuclear program. Like every myth, the account of Iran’s “frozen” nuclear program is easy to refute by looking at the evidence. Throughout the JPA process, Iran has continued to conduct extensive nuclear research and development including research on enhanced centrifuge technological capabilities — so it can enrich better and faster. Indeed, since the signing of the JPA, Iran has not dismantled even a single centrifuge.
The second key myth concerns the depiction of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani as a moderate. A decade after his deceptive stewardship of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team in 2003, Rouhani’s stance is no less uncompromising. For example, Rouhani has stated that, not under any circumstances would Iran destroy any of its existing centrifuges. And in response to a question over the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, Rouhani said, “One hundred percent [no].”
Rouhani has also failed to prove himself a “moderate” at home. In two recent reports, the United Nations has documented the alarming spike in executions, cases of torture and unremitting intolerance to dissenting political views and religious diversity under Rouhani. His record, when viewed in concert with his nearly four-decade friendship with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, leads to one conclusion: Rouhani is clearly no “moderate.”
The third key myth of the JPA originated in November 2013 when the JPA was first struck. In the aftermath of the agreement, some claimed that sanctions pressure would continue to mount since existing sanctions would be vigorously enforced.
In fact, both the number of sanction designations and the rate of implementation have fallen dramatically. In the six months before Rouhani’s election, there were 183 new Iran-related designations. In the 18 months since his election, there have been only 104. Moreover, despite promises by President Obama to “come down on these companies like a ton of bricks,” a staggering number of Western companies are conducting talks with Iranian entities with impunity. In 2014, London hosted the inaugural Europe-Iran Forum, which explicitly cited the prospect of a new business climate between Europe and Iran, a momentous commercial opportunity.
Incredibly, some even claimed that Iran would be “even deeper in the hole … when the deal expires …” and that economic pressure would increase. The sanctions relief provided to Iran under the JPA was also characterized as “insignificant” since it would total only $6 billion to $7 billion.
Such predictions have foundered on the rocks of reality. For example, Iran’s crude oil and oil products exports increased by 28 percent in 2014, and in October, the Iranian Central Bank reported a quarterly 4.6 percent gross-domestic product increase compared to 2013, the first positive growth in two years. Clearly such a spike is not “economically insignificant.”
This extra revenue — coupled with the evaporation of reputational risk — means there will be less pressure for Iran to make significant concessions on its nuclear program. The two extensions of the JPA have borne this out. As sanctions pressure diminishes, Iran sits comfortably in the driver’s seat, happy to extend the JPA indefinitely while benefiting from extensive relief.
It may be comforting to wrap the JPA in a shroud of mythical success, but the facts tell a much different and troubling cautionary tale.
David Ibsen is executive director of United Against Nuclear Iran, a nonprofit, nonpartisan advocacy group that seeks to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
An earlier version misidentified the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
